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STACKING THE DECK AGAINST THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY:
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Ferguson
698 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 1997)
Joseph Sclafani*
I. INTRODUCTION
Stacking, the aggregation of coverage limits contained in single or multiple
insurance policies, has been the subject of intense judicial scrutiny for a number
of years in Mississippi. In July 1997, the Mississippi Supreme Court handed
down a unanimous decision in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v.
Ferguson,' holding that anti-stacking clauses contained in insurance policies are
void as against public policy.2 The decision followed a series of cases in which
the court, when faced with anti-stacking clauses, avoided them under various
conventional contract theories.3 The Ferguson decision went one step further,
declaring anti-stacking clauses absolutely unenforceable.
This Note will provide a general background of the development of uninsured
motorist (UM) law and show that, from its inception, courts were always willing
to find a way to provide insureds maximum UM coverage, even at the expense of
the insurer. Next, this Note will explain and analyze the court's most recent
attempt to prevent the enforcement of anti-stacking clauses. Finally, this Note
will try to anticipate the effect Ferguson will have on the insurance industry and
explore possible market solutions available to insurance companies.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 18, 1993, Dorothy Ferguson, while riding as a passenger in her
Cadillac Seville, was hit by a vehicle negligently driven by Marzee Sipes.' As a
result of the collision, Mrs. Ferguson suffered over $100,000 in damages.5 At the
time of the collision, Mrs. Ferguson and her husband, Reid Ferguson, had three
vehicles, a Cadillac, a GMC truck, and a Pontiac Firebird, insured under a single
USF&G policy with a $25,000 limit for Uninsured Motorist Bodily Injury
(UMBI) on each vehicle.' Under the policy, the Fergusons paid separate premi-
ums for each car for liability and uninsured motorist property damages, but paid
only a single premium of $45.00 every six months for UMBI coverage.7 Marzee
Sipes' vehicle was insured by Allstate, with a $25,000 limit on liability.8
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2. ld. at 77.
3. See infra Part III.
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On October 11, 1994, Mrs. Ferguson wrote USF&G demanding $75,000, the
aggregate amount of the UMBI coverage for the three cars covered under the sin-
gle policy? The letter stated that Mrs. Ferguson would accept $25,000 from
Allstate and $52,000 from USF&G to settle her claim." USF&G responded with
a letter stating that because Mrs. Ferguson's policy contained an unambiguous
anti-stacking clause and because the total uninsured motorist coverage was
greater that the statutory minimum of $10,000 per car,11 she was only eligible to
receive $5,000 ($10,000 per vehicle, times three, less the offset of Allstate's
$25,000 payment). 2 USF&G waived its potential subrogation rights against
Marzee Sipes, allowing Mrs. Ferguson to release Allstate and Sipes. 3 USF&G
then paid Mrs. Ferguson $5,000.'
On February 4, 1994, Mrs. Ferguson filed a complaint for declaratory judg-
ment in Lafayette County Circuit Court.'" Mrs. Ferguson alleged that USF&G
had previously paid stacked uninsured motorist coverage and should not be
allowed to unilaterally change its policy without notifying its insured.'6 In the
alternative, even if USF&G was entitled to limit stacking, she should nonetheless
receive $20,000 ($25,000 for the vehicle involved in the collision, plus $10,000
for each of the two vehicles covered under the policy, less the $25,000 credit off-
set of Allstate). 7
Following discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. 8 On
December 6, 1994, Judge Kenneth Coleman heard oral argument. 9 Following
oral argument, Judge Coleman rendered a bench opinion granting Mrs. Fer-
guson's motion for summary judgment and denying USF&G's motion.2" On
December 10, 1994, the court entered a nunc pro tunc order granting Mrs.
Ferguson's motion and ordering USF&G to pay $70,000 ($25,000 for each of the
three vehicles, less $5,000 previously paid to Mrs. Ferguson).2'
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. The Genesis of Uninsured Motorist Coverage
In 1956, uninsured motorist coverage, or family protection insurance, as it is
sometimes called, came into existence at the behest of the automobile insurance
industry in an effort to address the growing problems created by the rapidly
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101 (1996).







19. Id. at 78-79.
20. Id. at 79.
21. Id.
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increasing number of uninsured vehicles.22 Uninsured motorist coverage was an
attempt by the insurance industry to displace publicly administered judgment-
funds and compulsory insurance programs. 3 As such, the purpose of Uninsured
Motorist coverage was to "give the same protection to the person injured by an
uninsured motorist as he would have had if he had been injured in an accident
caused by an automobile covered by a standard liability policy."24
The concept became so popular that many states, including Mississippi, began
to require that all automobile liability policies include an endorsement for unin-
sured motorist coverage.25 This requirement, in its current version, is codified in
§ 83-11-101 of the Mississippi Code, as follows:
(1) No automobile liability insurance policy or contract shall be issued or deliv-
ered after January 1, 1967, unless it contains an endorsement or provisions
undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to
recover as damages for bodily injury or death from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle, within limits which shall be no less than those set forth
in the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, as amended, under
provisions approved by the commissioner of insurance; however, at the option of
the insured, the uninsured motorist limits may be increased to limits not to
exceed those provided in the policy of bodily injury liability insurance of the
insured or such lesser limits as the insured elects to carry over the minimum
requirement set forth by this section. The coverage herein required shall not be
applicable where any insured named in the policy shall reject the coverage in
writing and provided further, that unless the named insured requests such cover-
age in writing, such coverage need not be provided in any renewal policy where
the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previ-
ously issued to him by the same insurer.26
In 1973, the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the Uninsured Motorist Statute
for the first time and stated that its purpose "is to provide protection to innocent
insured motorists and passengers injured as a result of the negligence of finan-
cially irresponsible drivers."27 The court went on to declare that "[s]uch provi-
sions are to be liberally construed to accomplish such purpose."28
As a direct result of the growth in popularity of UM coverage, numerous ques-
tions concerning the scope of UM coverage arose. The first question to reach the
Mississippi Supreme Court was "[d]oes [a UM] policy cover an insured owner of
an automobile and the members of his family who are injured while riding in or
on another motor vehicle not mentioned in the insurance policy?"29 In Lowery,
22. Rampy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 So. 2d 428, 431-32 (Miss. 1973).
23. Id. at 432.
24. Id. See 7 AM. JuR. 2D Automobile Insurance 135; Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 140 S.E.2d
817 (Va. 1965); Storm v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 97 S.E.2d 759 (Va. 1957); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Brower, 134 S.E.2d 277 (Va. 1964) (citing Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 156 N.W2d 133, 136-37 (Neb.
1968)).
25. MIss. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101 (1996).
26. Id.
27. Rampy, 278 So. 2d at 432.
28. Id. See supra note 22.
29. Lowery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 767, 769 (Miss. 1973).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
James W, Lowery was riding a Honda motor bike when, through no fault of his
own, he was struck by a 1963 Ford automobile negligently driven by Joe
Palmertree.30 Mr. Palmertree was an uninsured motorist." Though the motor
bike operated by Mr. Lowery was not covered under any insurance policy, he none-
theless contended that, since he lived in the household of his father, he was
insured under the terms of a State Farm policy covering the family's 1969
Plymouth. 2 The policy in question contained $5,000 in UMBI coverage.3
Under the express terms of the policy, however, the "insurance [was] not [to]
apply ... to bodily injuries to an insured while occupying or through being
struck by a land motor vehicle owned by a named insured or any resident of the
same household, if such vehicle is not [listed in the policy as] an owned motor
vehicle."3 In essence, the question of law before the court was whether "the
terms of the . . . [exclusionary provision] conflict with the Mississippi statutes
requiring all automobile liability insurance policies to contain an uninsured
motorist provision."3
The court, after examining the purpose of Mississippi's statutory scheme gov-
erning UM coverage, held that if "public policy is violated by any restrictive lan-
guage inserted in an insurance policy having the effect of defeating the purpose
and intent of the statute, such provisions must be considered nugatory and
void."36 The court stated that the "purpose of [Mississippi's Uninsured Motorist
Act] is to provide protection to innocent insured motorists and passengers injured
as a result of the negligence of financially irresponsible drivers."37 The court
went on to conclude that "[t]he great weight of authority supports appellant's
contention that the exclusionary clause in the present case violates the public
policy of this state as manifested by the Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Act...
[t]herefore, judgment will be entered here for [the sum of $5,000] in favor of the
appellant . ".. .38
In the wake of Lowery, the court was faced with the question of whether the
"[i]nsured, under the uninsured motorist coverage of his policy, is entitled to the
benefit of the aggregate amount of coverage provided in a single insurance poli-
cy insuring more than one vehicle."39 In Talbot, William Talbot, the insured, was
involved in a collision with an automobile owned and operated by Robert L.
Johnson, an uninsured motorist." As a result of the collision, Mr. Talbot sus-
tained damages for bodily injuries in the sum of $9,800.41 At the time of the
accident, Mr. Talbot was the owner of four cars covered under a single State




34. Id. at 769.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 770 (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Powell, 206 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. App. 1968)).
37. Lowery, 285 So. 2d at 770 (citing Rampy, 278 So. 2d at 432).
38. Lowery, 285 So. 2d at 777-78.
39. Talbot v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 291 So. 2d 699, 701 (Miss. 1974).
40. Id. at 700.
41. Id.
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Farm insurance policy providing UM coverage in the amount of $5,000 per vehi-
cle.42 The total premium for all of the coverage was calculated per vehicle.43
Thus, Mr. Talbot asserted that the total UM coverage available to him under the
policy was $20,000, and he could recover the entire $9,800.11
State Farm countered this argument by asserting the Limits of Liability clause
in the policy.4" Under the policy,
[t]he company's limit of liability for all damages, including damages for care
and loss of services, arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person in any
one accident shall not exceed the amount specified by the financial responsibili-
ty law of the state in which this policy is issued for bodily injury to one person
in any one accident.4
Thus, because the minimum coverage available under the Mississippi Motor
Vehicle Responsibility Law47 was $5,000, Mr. Talbot was limited to a recovery in
that amount."
The court, addressing this case as one of first impression, held that
[t]here [was] no requirement that the coverage shall be more than the minimum
thus stated [in the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law] .... It
follows that the parties to this suit were free to contract as to uninsured motorist
coverage in any respect so long as the required coverage is not cut down by the
policy provisions.49
Thus, because the "limitation clause involved in this case is clear and unambigu-
ous," Mr. Talbot was limited in his recovery to $5,000.50 In the course of its
opinion, the court visited the issue of separate premiums paid by Mr. Talbot for
the four vehicles, but held that "the question of premiums has no proper place in
determining whether Insured has aggregate coverage under the uninsured motorist
provisions of the policy.""s
In a dissenting opinion, which would later be adopted by a majority of the
court, Justice Broom felt that the issue of separate premiums was key to the reso-
lution of the case before the court, suggesting that the case should have been
decided as follows:
(1) The insured before us is entitled to his full damages under all coverages for
which a premium has been paid; (2) the 'Limit of Liability' clause will not be
permitted to operate in such a fashion as to deprive the insured of benefits for
which a premium was paid; [and] (3) the 'Limit of Liability' clause is so word-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 701.
45. Id. at 700.
46. Id. at 700-01.
47. MIss. CODE ANN. 63-15-1 (1996)
48. Talbot, 291 So. 2d at 701.
49. Id. See Harthcock v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 456 (Miss. 1971).
50. Talbot, 291 So. 2d at 702.
51. Id.
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ed as to be susceptible of differing and contradictory meanings and is legally
ambiguous, and is therefore to be construed most strongly against its creator,
State Farm. 2
In Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. Roberts, the court
was faced with the question of "whether the $10,000 coverage afforded by the
uninsured motorist endorsement to three separate policies issued by the same
insurer ... to the same insured ... can be aggregated or stacked to cover dam-
ages for bodily injuries suffered as a proximate result of the negligence of an
uninsured motorist." 3 In Roberts, the insured was injured as a result of a colli-
sion with a truck driven by an uninsured motorist."4 Mary Roberts, mother of the
insured, brought suit against Southern Farm Bureau Insurance Company in the
amount of $30,000 based on three separate policies covering three separate vehi-
cles, all insured by Farm Bureau. 5 Farm Bureau countered with an argument
analogous to State Farm's argument in Talbot, asserting that a Limits of Liability
clause prevented the stacking of the coverages.6
The court, ruling in favor of Roberts and allowing the stacking of the UM cov-
erages, held that "[a] separate premium was paid for each policy, and each policy
with its uninsured motorist endorsement was complete within itself."5 7 Unlike
Talbot, where there was "only one insurance policy with one uninsured motorist
endorsement covering a fleet of four automobiles, . . . there were three separate
policies and, as required by statute, an uninsured motorist endorsement in each
policy."5 8 Thus, when the "coverage of uninsured motorist endorsement [is con-
tained] in three separate policies of insurance, [such coverage] could be aggre-
gated."5 9
B. Stacking Based on Policy Ambiguity
Following Talbot and Roberts, it was clear that the protection provided by unin-
sured motorist coverage was firmly embedded in public policy and that each
insurance policy must provide the minimum coverage required by statute. How-
ever, it was unclear whether, under any set of circumstances, UM coverage on
multiple vehicles contained in a single policy could ever be stacked. In 1977, the
Mississippi Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to address the
question of whether, "under the uninsured motorist coverage of a single automo-
bile policy,... [the insured could] aggregate the amount of coverage provided...
on each of the three insured automobiles."6
52. Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
53. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 323 So. 2d 536 (Miss. 1975).
54. Id. at 537.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 538.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 539.
60. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Bridges, 350 So. 2d 1379, 1381 (Miss. 1979).
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In Bridges, the insured was negligently struck and killed as a result of a hit and
run accident. 1 The insured's next of kin brought an action against Hartford
Insurance Company in the amount of $30,000, representing the aggregate of UM
coverage contained in a single insurance policy covering three vehicles. 2 The
court began by expressing some reservation about the rule pronounced in Talbot,
stating that it stood for the "proposition that an insurance company can legally
insure more than one automobile in the same policy and limit its uninsured
motorist coverage to the minimum amount specified by the financial responsibil-
ity law... [if] done by clear and unambiguous language. ' 3
In the case before the bar, however, the limits of liability clause in the policy
was "ambiguous and [needed to] be construed most strongly against its creator."6"
Further,
[w]hile the charging of a separate premium is not necessarily controlling in
determining whether the insured has aggregate coverage under the uninsured
motorist provision of the policy, when a separate premium is charged for unin-
sured motorist coverage it raises a presumption or inference that the coverage in
the one policy is the same as would be furnished if such coverage was provided
for in separate policies covering the same vehicles.65
Thus, because of the "ambiguous" nature of the wording of the policy at bar, the
coverage offered under it "could be aggregated and stacked to the extent of the
damage suffered by the insured."6
Following Bridges, the court produced a series of opinions avoiding limits of
liability clauses and allowing stacking based on ambiguity. For example, in
Pearthree v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., the court, faced with two insur-
ance companies covering the same two automobiles, both under a single policy,
held that
[a] construction permitting aggregation flows from the ambiguity of the limiting
clauses in the policies covering more than one automobile, not from the charg-
ing of separate premiums .... [t]he courts of this State have consistently held
that ambiguity and doubt in policies be resolved against the writer of the policy,
the insurance company, and in favor of the insured.67
Thus, it was clear that all questions of ambiguity regarding anti-stacking clauses
would be resolved in favor of the insured, and, in order to avoid such outcomes,
the insurance industry would be forced to compose anti-stacking clauses which
were clear and unambiguous on their face.
61. Id. at 1380.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1381.
64. Id. at 1381-82.
65. Id. at 1381.
66. Id. at 1382.
67. Pearthree v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 373 So. 2d 267, 270 (Miss. 1979); see Bridge, 350 So. 2d
at 1381 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 233 So. 2d 805 (Miss. 1970)).
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C. Stacking Based on the Payment of Multiple Premiums
In 1984, the Fifth Circuit, through a certified question, asked the Mississippi
Supreme Court to evaluate the language in a limit of liability clause to determine
if it was "sufficiently clear and unambiguous to prevent the aggregation of unin-
sured motorist coverage and limit liability to $10,000." In Brown, a single poli-
cy insured three vehicles for which separate premiums were paid. 9 The court
began by stating that "[a] motorist is often covered under the uninsured provi-
sions of more than one policy or, in the case of a single policy, by premiums for
multi-vehicular coverage.' 7 The court restated the rules promulgated in Talbot
and Bridges and held that
[t]he Bridges decision now appears to be the better reasoned holding and we
now adopt its rationale and expressly abandon the Talbot rationale. 1 We reiter-
ate from Bridges that a presumption arises that coverage of multi-vehicles in
one policy, where separate premiums were paid for each endorsement of unin-
sured motorist coverage, is the same as if such coverage was provided in sepa-
rate policies covering the same vehicles."
The court went on to adopt the dissent of Justice Broom in Talbot, holding that
''recovery cannot be limited by an insurer for benefits for which a premium is
paid by an insured, notwithstanding clear and unambiguous language of attempt-
ed limitations by the insurer."" Thus, even if the language of the limit of liability
clause was clear and unambiguous, it would not be enough to prevent the insured
from receiving the benefits for which he paid.74 Further, the court held, "this
Court still recognizes the general principle that in any insurance contract, unclear
and ambiguous language will be construed in favor of the insured.""5
In response to Brown, the insurance industry sought to disguise separate premi-
ums charged for multiple coverages in a single policy through the use of lump
sum premiums.76 In Harrison, the automobile operated by Dudly Harrison col-
lided with an automobile operated by Timothy Clark.77 Mr. Clark was an unin-
sured motorist; thus, Mr. Harrison qualified for uninsured motorist coverage
under a single policy issued to him by Allstate covering his two automobiles.78
The policy provided UM coverage of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per acci-
dent.79 Initially, Mr. Harrison paid a premium of $22.50 for each of his two cars
covered under the policy." However, in 1989, Allstate amended its billing struc-
68. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Miss. 1984).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1004.





76. Harrison v. Allstate Ins. Co., 662 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Miss. 1995).
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ture to charge a single premium of $52.40 for UM coverages under a single poli-
cy covering two or more vehicles." This rate for multi-car policies was in excess
of the $28.40 charged for policies covering only a single vehicle.82
Relying on the change of billing, Allstate tendered a check for UM benefits to
Mr. Harrison in the amount of $10,000. "3 On September 25, 1991, Mr. Harrison
filed suit in the Circuit Court of Humphreys County against Allstate demanding
$20,000 in stacked UM coverage.84 Allstate responded by filing a motion for
summary judgment.85 The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
Allstate, and Mr. Harrison appealed.88 On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that
[alithough the policy language precluding stacking is clear, we find that Harrison
was actually charged separate premiums for his two vehicles under the guise of
one lump sum on his declaration sheet. Because the premium for two cars is
$24 more than the premium for one car, Allstate clearly charges an additional
premium for the second car. We find this case factually similar to Brown, the
only difference being that Allstate in the present case charged separate unin-
sured motorist premiums by lumping them together on the declaration sheet.
Thus, Harrison is entitled to stack his uninsured motorist coverage up to his pol-
icy limits of $20,000.87
As a result of the court's ruling in Harrison, the insurance industry was forced to
abandon the practice of cloaking separate premiums in the guise of one lump
sum.
With Bridges and Brown, the court had promulgated two ways in which to
avoid the attempts of the insurance industry to limit its liability in the context of
UM coverage. First, the court could void the terms of the policy if the wording
was deemed ambiguous. Second, if the insured paid separate premiums under a
single policy for UM coverage, the insured was entitled to the benefits for which
he paid and thus could aggregate the UM coverages.
D. Offset and Stacking of Unrelated Policies
In 1979, in an attempt to provide more protection for motorists involved in col-
lisions with parties who do not have adequate insurance to cover their liability,
the Mississippi Legislature amended Mississippi's Uninsured Motorist statute,
effective January 1, 1980, to broaden the definition of uninsured motorist to






86. Id. at 1093-94.
87. Id. at 1094-95.
88. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-103 (1996).
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part, as follows: "(c) [t]he term 'uninsured motor vehicle' shall mean: ... (iii) An
insured motor vehicle, when the liability insurer of such vehicle has provided limits
of bodily injury liability for its insured vehicle which are less than the limits applic-
able to the injured person provided under his uninsured motorist coverage .... -"I
As a result of the amendment to the UM statute, the insurance industry imme-
diately attempted to reduce its exposure by inserting clauses into policies allow-
ing for the reduction of the amount of UM coverage available by any amount
paid to the insured from the underinsured's liability coverage. In 1985, the
Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the validity of such "offset" clauses.9" In
Kuehling, Ms. Kuehling suffered substantial injuries as a result of a head-on col-
lision with a vehicle negligently driven by Timothy Sparling.9" Mr. Sparling was
insured by a policy with a liability coverage limit of $10,000.92 Ms. Kuehling
settled her claim with Mr. Sparling's insurance company for the maximum avail-
able under the coverage.93 In addition, Ms. Kuehling was insured by State Farm
under two separate policies, each with a UM limit of $10,000." 4 State Farm
relied on a limit of liability clause which provided that "[a]ny amount payable
under this section for bodily injury (property damage) shall be reduced by... (2)
An amount equal to total limits of liability for bodily injury (property damage) of
all liability policies that apply to accident" to pay Ms. Kuehling $10,000, repre-
senting the difference between the aggregate of the two UM coverages less the
amount received from Mr. Sparling's insurance coverage.
95
Ms. Kuehling filed suit against her insurance carrier challenging the validity of
the limit of liability provision which allowed for the offset of UM benefits under
her policy by any amount paid by the tortfeasor's liability insurance.9" The
Supreme Court, reversing the Circuit Court's summary judgment in favor of Ms.
Kuehling, entered a summary judgment in favor of State Farm.97 The court stat-
ed that
the clear language of the policy provided for offsets of the uninsured motorist
coverage by amounts paid by the tortfeasor's carrier and are controlling in this
case. The uninsured motorist statute does not prohibit such provisions. There-
fore, State Farm is entitled to offset the total of its uninsured motorist coverage
by the $10,000 settlement awarded to appellee from the tortfeasor's insurance
company."
As a result of Kuehling, the insurance industry was able to limit its liability for
UM coverage by offsetting the amount of money available to the insured from
the liability coverage of the uninsured motorist.
89. Id. 83-11-103(c)(iii).
90. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kuehling, 475 So. 2d 1159 (Miss. 1985).
91. Id. at 1160.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1161.
94. Id. at 1160.
95. Id. at 1161.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1163.
98. Id. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eubanks, 620 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Miss. 1985).
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In Wickline v. USF&G,99 the court was faced with two very important ques-
tions. First, which UM policy limits are to be aggregated to determine if the neg-
ligent tortfeasor is uninsured?.. Second, once the tortfeasor is deemed unin-
sured, which policies are available to the injured party?10 ' In Wickline, Stacie
Wickline was riding as a passenger in a car driven by Mills Carter, Ill.1"2 The
automobile collided with a parked car on the side of the road, resulting in the
death of Ms. Wickline.'03 Mr. Carter's car was insured by USF&G under a single
policy which also provided coverage for Carter's other three cars."0 4 The liability
coverage under the single USF&G policy was $10,000 per person and $20,000
per accident.'05 In addition, Ms. Wickline was insured under two of her own
insurance policies, issued by State Farm, with UM coverage of $10,000 per per-
son and $20,000 per accident on each policy."'0 The Wickline family quickly set-
tled with State Farm in the amount of $30,000.07 In an attempt to settle in a sim-
ilarly quick fashion, USF&G sent the Wicklines a check for $10,000, represent-
ing the maximum amount of liability coverage per person.' 8 The Wicklines filed
suit against USF&G asserting that they were entitled to $80,000. 109
The court first addressed the issue of whether Ms. Wickline qualified for UM
benefits. 110 The court held that if a party is "injured while riding as a passenger,
the uninsured motorist coverage of the vehicle in which he is riding, in addition
to that of his own vehicles, is applicable to the injured person.""'1 Thus, because
the aggregate of the UM coverage available to Ms. Wickline was $30,000 and the
liability coverage of Mr. Carter was only $10,000, the Carter vehicle qualified as
uninsured. 2
The court then turned to the issue of how much UM coverage was available to
Ms. Wickline under Carter's insurance policy."3 The court held that Ms. Wick-
line qualified as an insured under Carter's insurance policy and because the court
could
not on principle distinguish [Wickline's] case from Brown, Pearthree, and
Bridges,.... all classes [statutorily insured] may recover [from] a UM insurer all
amounts he or she may be entitled to recover as damages from the uninsured
motorist, limited only by the limits of UM coverage multiplied by the number of
vehicles insured in the policy." 4
99. 530 So. 2d 708 (Miss. 1988).
100. Id.
101. Id.








110. Id. at 711-13.
111. Id. at 713. See Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 323 So. 2d 536 (Miss. 1975).
112. Wickline, 530 So. 2d at 713.
113. Id. at 713-15.
114. Id. at 715.
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Thus, the Wicklines were entitled to recover $40,000 under Carter's UM cover-
age, offset by the $10,000 received as a result of liability coverage of the tortfea-
sor's insurance coverage."'5
E. Attempts to Limit Stacking to Statutory Minimum Limits
In the wake of Kuehling and Wickline, it was clear that an insurer could limit
its potential liability through the use of offset clauses and that the stacking of
unrelated UM coverages was permissible. Thus, since UM coverages contained
in separate policies could now be stacked, the question arose as to whether the
insurance company could seek to limit this potential liability through the use of
anti-stacking clauses which attempted to limit exposure to the statutory mini-
mum.1 '6 In Koestler, the court was faced with two policies providing, in the
aggregate, five UM coverages, each with limits of liability well in excess of the
statutory minimum and each with clear and unambiguous policy provisions that
prevented the stacking of coverages in excess of the statutory minimum.117 Mr.
Koestler owned five automobiles, three insured under one policy and two under a
separate policy. "8 Both policies were issued by Casualty Reciprocal Exchange
(CRE). "9 He paid separate premiums for each of the five coverages with each
coverage providing $250,000 UMBI coverage.12 Additionally, each policy con-
tained a limit of liability provision providing that, in the event of multiple cover-
age, the insurance company's liability "[would] not exceed the highest applicable
limit of liability under any one policy" - i.e. $250,000 for UMBI.12' In addition
to the coverage afforded under CRE's policies, Mr. Koestler purchased $1,000,000
in bodily injury or wrongful death insurance coverage from Federal Insurance
Company.'22 Upon the death of Mr. Koestler, resulting from the negligence of a
totally uninsured motorist, Mrs. Koestler filed suit against the insurance carriers
in the amount of $2,500,000.123 The case went to trial, and, during a recess, the
two insurance carriers agreed to settle the claim for $1,100,000.124 Under the
terms of the settlement, each would pay $550,000 to Ms. Koestler and the two
insurance companies would be allowed to file claims for indemnification against
one another. 
12 5
CRE claimed, as they had all along, that their liability was limited to $250,000,
and they thus filed a claim against Federal in the amount of $300,000. 126 Federal
felt that CRE's liability was $1,250,000 and that because the settlement of
$1,100,000 was less than their potential liability, they should be able to recover
115. Id. at 717.
116. Koestler v. Federal Ins. Co., 608 So. 2d 1258 (Miss. 1992).
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the entire $550,000.' The court addressed the issue of liability by stating that
"[i]nsurance policies are privately made law. Except as limited by the public law,
we respect the right of insurer and insured to contract freely one with the other."'28
The court went on to say that there was "no public policy against limiting insur-
ance coverages. Over and above legally mandated minimums, the parties have
always remained free to agree as they wish." '129 Thus, the court held that "[w]hat
is important is that the policies clearly told Koestler what coverage his premiums
purchased for him, and what limits of liability entailed that coverage. What we have
before us is limits of liability language that no one could fail to understand."" '3 The
court went on to explore the possible remedies available to Koestler if he object-
ed to the coverage provided under CRE's policy:
We have no doubt insureds like Koestler could pay a greater premium and pur-
chase multiple UM coverages without the limitation clause, if not now, then
soon. Money and the opportunity for profit can move the bureaucratically inert,
even in the insurance industry. Beyond this, there is the public remedy across
the street. If the Legislature disagrees with our action today, it may well amend
the UM statute. It is within the legislative prerogative to provide, in the case of
multiple UM coverages or policies, where the insured has paid and the insurer
has received a separate premium, the insured may stack and thus recover on
each such coverage or policy otherwise according to its terms, and that any lan-
guage in any such coverage or policy to the contrary is a contract against public
policy and is, thus, unenforceable. To date the Legislature has not so enacted,
nor may we, consistent with our UM renderings heretofore. 131
Thus, the court held that the CRE's liability was limited to $250,000 and entered
a judgment in favor of CRE, against Federal, in the amount of $300,000. 132
As a result of Koestler, the court validated the use of anti-stacking clauses
which limited the insured's exposure to the statutory minimum. However, it was
not until 1994 that the court resolved the question of the statutory minimum." In
Garriga, the court defined the statutory minimum amount of UM coverage an
insurance company must provide its insured which may not be reduced by offset
clauses.134 The court cited the language of Koestler, stating that "[o]ver and above
legally mandated minimums, the parties have always remained free to agree as
they wish."'3 After a review of the development of§ 83-11-111, the court stated:
[i]t must be read for what it plainly imports, an option given the insured to
increase coverage, over which the insurer has no control other than refusal to
increase bodily injury liability limits .... The correct interpretation of the
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1263. See also Perry v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 170 So. 2d 628, 630 (Miss. 1965).
129. Koestler, 608 So. 2d at 1263.
130. Id. at 1263-64.
131. Id. at 1264.
132. Id.
133. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So. 2d 658 (Miss. 1994).
134. Id. at 659.
135. Id. at 663 (citing Koestler, 608 So. 2d at 1263).
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statutory scheme as it developed and in its present form is that carriers are com-
manded by statute to provide coverage up to the amount of liability insurance
purchased where the insured so desires and cannot reduce this amount by excep-
tion of the type here involved.136
In dissent, Justice Pittman took issue with the holding of the court, stating that
"the majority now holds that the insured, rather than the Legislature, sets the
statutory minimum amount of uninsured motorist coverage limited only by the
amount of liability coverage purchased and that this uninsured motorist coverage
cannot be reduced by any language contained in the insurance contract."
1 37
Justice Pittman went on to take the same position as the U.S. District Court in
Porter v. Shelter General Insurance Company,131 stating that "the minimum
amount of uninsured motorist coverage shall be no less than that required by the
Mississippi Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law . . [providing] that the
minimum limits are $10,000 for any one person and $20,000 per accident."'
139
As a result of the court's ruling in Garriga, the minimum amount of UM cov-
erage which an insurer must provide an insured, if he so requests, is an amount
equal to the amount of liability coverage which the insured purchases. Thus, in
essence, if an insurance company wishes to limit the amount of UM coverage
which an insured can demand, the company must limit the amount of liability
coverage which it sells the insured.
IV INSTANT CASE
In Ferguson, USF&G began its appeal after the Circuit Court's ruling on the
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment."'4 The Circuit Court for Lafayette
County ruled that Mrs. Ferguson was entitled to receive the aggregate of the
three UM coverages available under the single policy issued by USF&G covering
the Fergusons' three vehicles.' 4 1 Thus, USF&G was ordered to pay Mrs.
Ferguson $75,000, with credit given for the $5,000 previously paid by USF&G,
but not allowing an offset of the $25,000 which she received from the negligent
tortfeasor's insurance carrier.'1 2 The Mississippi Supreme Court granted USF&G's
appeal and affirmed the lower court's ruling in regard to USF&G's liability. 143
However, the court reversed the lower court's ruling with respect to the holding
that USF&G was not allowed to offset the amount of money paid by the tort-
feasor's liability carrier and rendered a decision giving USF&G credit for the
$25,000 which Mrs. Ferguson had received. " Justice Sullivan delivered the
opinion of the court, with Justice Smith concurring only in the result and Chief
Justice Lee specially concurring in a separate opinion. 4 5
136. Garriga, 636 So. 2d at 664-65.
137. Id. at 665.
138. 678 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
139. Id. See Miss. CODEANN. § 63-15-11 (1972).
140. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Ferguson, 698 So. 2d 77, 78 (Miss. 1997).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 79.
143. Id. at 80.
144. Id. at 82.
145. Id. at 77-78.
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A. Justice Sullivan s Opinion
The Court held that
the public policy of this State mandates stacking of UM coverage for every
vehicle covered under a policy, regardless of the number or amount of the pre-
mium(s) paid for UM coverage .... [Thus,] anti-stacking clauses as applied to
UM coverage are against public policy, and contracts contrary to public policy
are unenforceable. 4
In an attempt to justify this conclusion, the court first examined the intent of
Mississippi's uninsured motorist laws, followed by an examination of the insur-
ance industry.147
The court began by reiterating the purpose of UM coverages: "Uninsured
Motorist coverage is designed to provide innocent injured motorists a means to
recover all sums to which they are entitled from an uninsured motorist."1 The
court pointed out that, in an attempt to achieve this goal, courts have found
"ambiguity in the language of the policy or the fact that separate premiums were
charged for each car" as a means to allow stacking of UM coverage, despite anti-
stacking clauses."4 9 In response to prior decisions, the insurance industry began
rewriting its policies to contain plain and unambiguous limit of liability clauses
and restructuring its fee schedules. 0 This restructuring, the court held, was noth-
ing more than an attempt "to circumvent case law and defeat public policy."
' 151
The court next moved on to an examination of the insurance industry, stating:
[i]nsurance contracts essentially are contracts of adhesion. The insured has only
two choices in 'negotiating' the terms of his policy-he may accept the terms
offered by his insurance company, or he may reject them and go to a different
insurance company. When the entire insurance industry writes its policies to
preclude stacking of UM coverage ... the insured is denied any choice whatso-
ever. 152
Thus, the court concluded by saying, "[b]ased upon the sound economic benefits
of allowing stacking and the lack of bargaining power of the insured, we announce
a new public policy against anti-stacking provisions in insurance contracts ...."I"
146. Id. at 79. See Hertz Commercial Leasing Div. v. Morrison, 567 So. 2d 832, 834-35 (Miss. 1990).
147. Ferguson, 698 So. 2d at 79-80.
148. Id. at 80.
149. Id. at 79.
150. Id. at 80.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 82.
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The court then moved on to address USF&G's argument that Mrs. Ferguson
could not recover benefits in excess of her liability coverage because Missis-
sippi's uninsured motorist law prevents an insured from carrying uninsured
motorist coverage in excess of liability coverage."5 4 The court, citing the lan-
guage of Garriga, rejected this argument, stating that
the statutory minimum is 'that amount of coverage that the insured elects up to the
amount of liability coverage purchased.' In other words, [Mississippi's uninsured
motorist law] authorizes the insured to demand UM coverage up to the amount of
his liability coverage limits. Nothing in the statute precludes an insured and insur-
er from contractually agreeing to a larger amount of UM coverage.'
Finally, the court addressed the validity of the offset clause in Mrs. Ferguson's
coverage allowing USF&G to limit its exposure by reducing its payment by the
amount received from the negligent tortfeasor's insurance. ' The court upheld
the offset clause, concluding that "[i]t is not against public policy to allow an
insurance company to maintain an offset clause to recover that portion of dam-
ages for which the tortfeasor is insured."' 57
B. Justice Lee ' Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Dan Lee began by stating that "the
majority [has] step[ed] across the fine line dividing interpretation of the law with
promulgation of the law."' 58 He felt that the court's holding interfered with the
parties' freedom to contract for insurance coverage and was not sanctioned by
Mississippi's uninsured motorist statute. 55 Justice Lee went on to recognize the
uneven bargaining power which often exists in the insurer/insured relationship.
He reasoned that, as a result of that inequity, all ambiguities must be decided in
favor of the insured.' However, the parties' freedom to contract is still of the
utmost importance and, as such, if the insured has a sufficient understanding of
the ramifications of the language of a policy, those terms should be enforced. 6 '
As in the case of UM coverage, if the insured rejects such coverage in writing,
the statutory scheme allows for a policy to be written without coverage.' 2 In a
similar fashion, an insured should be able to agree to an anti-stacking clause in a
policy if a separate waiver is signed. Such a rule, Justice Lee believed, would
"balance the interests in permitting private contractual relations between the par-
ties, and honoring the broad intent of the UM statute."' 63
154. Id. at 81.
155. Id. (quoting Garriga, 636 So. 2d at 659). See Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101(1).
156. Ferguson, 698 So. 2d at 81.
157. Id. at 82.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 83.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 84.
163. Id.
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V ANALYSIS
A. Changing the Rules of the Game
From a practical standpoint, the court, in Ferguson, reached the same conclu-
sion it has on numerous other occasions-refusing to enforce the anti-stacking
clause contained in the insured's policy and allowing the insured to aggregate the
UM coverages available for each vehicle covered under a single policy. How-
ever, the rationale which the court employed to reach this result is radical. In the
past, the court has turned to conventional theories of contract interpretation to
find a basis on which to allow the stacking of UM coverages. In this instance,
the court was without such a basis and, thus, declared anti-stacking clauses
absolutely void as against public policy.
Prior to Ferguson, the rationale employed by the court to avoid anti-stacking
clauses was limited to two general theories. First, the court relied on the conven-
tional interpretive tool of resolving all ambiguities in the contractual language
against the creator of the contract as a means to avoid anti-stacking clauses. Second,
the court relied on the inherent ambiguity created by charging separate premiums
for UM coverage as a means to avoid anti-stacking clauses. In both instances, how-
ever, the insurance companies were left with simple contractual drafting solutions as
a means to "circumvent" or comply with the rulings of the court. 16 In response to
the court deeming an anti-stacking clause ambiguous, an insurance company
would redraft the clause to provide clarity. Additionally, if the court declared the
billing scheme which the insurance company used inherently confusing, the insur-
ance company would simply modify the scheme and charge a single premium,
regardless of the number of vehicles covered under a single policy.
As a result of the court's ruling in Ferguson, insurance companies will no
longer be able to "circumvent" the court's decisions "by rewriting their policy
language and altering their premium schemes.""16  Instead, insurance companies
will be forced to adapt to the court's ruling by resorting to a market solution. In
order to compensate for the increased liability associated with the inability to
contractually prevent insureds from stacking UM coverages, insurers will in-
crease premiums. Consequently, relying on the basic economic principle that as
price increases, demand decreases, as premiums increase, demand for UM cover-
age will decrease. Ultimately, as a result of the increase in premiums, insureds
will purchase less coverage and the net effect of Ferguson will be a decrease in
the total amount of coverage available to insureds.
B. The Ferguson Effect
In Ferguson, the court attempted to neutralize the perceived superior bargain-
ing power of the insurance industry by preventing companies from including
anti-stacking clauses in the policies which they sold. Because of the rationale the
164. Id. at 79.
165. Id. at 84.
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court used to accomplish this end, however, insureds are left with no more bar-
gaining power than they were before Ferguson. Prior to Ferguson, the court stated
that insureds had no choice but to purchase policies which contained anti-stacking
clauses. Now, insureds have no choice but to purchase stacked coverage.
By choosing to declare anti-stacking clauses contrary to public policy, the
court has, in no way, leveled the playing field between insurers and insureds.
Instead, the result of Ferguson may be the pricing of some businesses out of the
insurance market. 6 For example, if a business wishes to purchase $10,000 of
UM coverage for each of the ten vehicles in its fleet, the Ferguson opinion will
significantly increase its cost. The insured will not be able to contractually limit
the coverage available under the policy through the use of an anti-stacking
clause. As a result, if the insured wishes to purchase $10,000 worth of coverage
for each vehicle, he will have to pay a premium equal to the purchase price of
$100,000 worth of coverage per vehicle, thus drastically increasing the cost of
coverage.
Though it is clear that the goal of the court in Ferguson was to increase the
amount of coverage available to insureds, because the court does not presently con-
trol the pricing mechanism, Ferguson will have the opposite effect. As such, unless
the court is willing to implement price controls, the next best alternative available to
the court would be to increase the burden on the insurance industry in order for anti-
stacking clauses to be enforceable. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Dan
Lee picked up on this line of reasoning and suggested increasing the burden on the
insurance industry by requiring insurers to bring to the attention of the insureds the
existence of an anti-stacking clause contained in the policy. '67 Chief Justice Lee
points out that, just as in the case of UM coverage in the first place, only upon a
signed waiver from the insured may the insurer omit UM coverage from a policy. 16
Likewise, the insurer should have to obtain a separate waiver from the insured in
order to prevent the stacking of UM coverages contained in a single policy. 169 In
the absence of such a waiver, UM coverage would be automatically stacked.7
VI. CONCLUSION
With respect to the outcome, the court's decision in Ferguson is not markedly
inconsistent with the court's prior decisions addressing anti-stacking clauses con-
166. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court has never "dealt with 'stacking' in a business or commercial
policy," a close reading of the court's opinion in Cossitt v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. reveals a reluc-
tance on the part of the court to differentiate between individual and commercial insurance policies. 551 So. 2d
879, 884 (Miss. 1989). In Cossitt, the court permitted the stacking of UM coverages on three church buses,
stating: "We are not faced here with a large, commercial fleet policy We are of the opinion that, under the facts
of the present case, stacking of the aggregate coverage of $75,000 uninsured motorist coverage should be...
allowed." Id. During the course of the opinion, the court cited, with approval, Howell v. Harleysville Mutual
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tained in insurance policies. However, with regard to the rationale chosen to
accomplish this end, the court's decision is problematic. For the first time, the
court turned from conventional tools of contract interpretation to avoid an anti-
stacking clause to a more radical means. Though the court may initially succeed
in its unstated goal of increasing the amount of coverage to insureds, ultimately,
as a result of the court's opinion, available coverage will decrease. The insurance
industry will compensate for the increased exposure resulting from Ferguson by
increasing premiums. As a direct result of price increases, it may be anticipated
that, consistent with market principles, insureds will purchase less coverage and,
in the long run, the net amount of coverage available to insureds will decrease.

